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et on the fictional island of Sweetland off the coast 
of Newfoundland in the early twenty-first century, Michael 
Crummey’s Sweetland (2014) charts the life of Moses Sweetland 
— a seventy-year-old man whose ancestors founded the island — as 
he struggles against a government resettlement program1 that would 
force him to leave the island. In response to this threat, the novel for-
mulates posthuman and post-anthropocentric forms of subjectivity in 
relation to place and to the pressing ecological concerns presented by the 
Anthropocene,2 in which the dominance of humans has had a perma-
nent and irrevocable impact on the planet. My critique draws on Rosi 
Braidotti’s notion that the Anthropocene involves a critique not merely 
of human privilege but also of the humanist ideology of a fixed and 
coherent sovereign subject: that is, “Man” (“Four Theses” 26). For the 
Anthropocene to be effectively challenged, “Neither ‘Man’ as the uni-
versal humanistic measure of all things nor Anthropos as the emblem 
of an exceptional species can claim the central position in contempor-
ary, technologically mediated knowledge production systems” (“Four 
Theses” 26). Instead, I argue that new relational modes of ontology 
must be established between human and non-human others that deny 
dualisms. Sweetland challenges the idea of a subjectivity framed within 
an anthropocentric “sense of place”: the subjectivity of the main char-
acter, Moses, is positioned in continual hierarchy to human and non-
human others during the realist first half of the novel. This sense of 
place is based upon an opposition between how “inside” or “outside” 
the island he considers others to be. However, in the second half of the 
novel, this subjectivity is challenged through gothic tropes that emerge 
when Moses is eventually left alone on the island. These tropes, such as 
haunting, imbue the island with a non-human agency, which functions 
to dismantle his sovereign and coherent sense of self in relation to the 
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island. These tropes culminate in a transformation of his subjectiv-
ity into one much more relational, posthuman, and aligned with an 
affirmative ethics.
An Anthropocentric Sense of Place
The resettlement program that the inhabitants of the island of 
Sweetland face is based upon the Household Resettlement Program. 
Running from 1953 to 1977, it sought to move rural inhabitants of 
Newfoundland to purportedly more industrially viable centres in an 
attempt to reshape the provincial economy.3 Mired in controversy, the 
program was and remains divisive in many communities, forcing resi-
dents “to make a decision that was shaped by financial incentives and, 
in cases where a united community decision was required by govern-
ment, by peer pressure from friends and neighbours” (Vodden 225). 
The contentious program altered, and continues to alter, the face of 
Newfoundland and Labrador profoundly, and roughly half of an “esti-
mated 1,300 pre-resettlement communities remain” (225).4 The “shut-
ting down” (effectively) of these communities raises questions about 
what was lost, and will be lost, in terms of individual and community 
identity in Newfoundland.
Approaching the Resettlement Program from a posthuman and 
post-anthropocentric perspective means distinguishing how this “loss 
of identity” is not necessarily tied to the loss of a closed connection to 
a particular place but conflated with environmental, social, and mental 
factors. Félix Guattari’s “ecosophy” helps to illuminate how and why 
this sense of loss is keenly felt. Guattari argues that these three eco-
logical registers — environmental, social, and mental — are intertwined 
and must be considered in relation to one another if the problems of the 
Anthropocene are to be addressed effectively. He posits that the systemic 
problem of integrated world capitalism (IWC) contributes to the major 
crises of human and non-human life. He defines IWC as a homogen-
izing system of capitalism “characterised by general equivalence” that 
“flattens out all other forms of value, alienating them in its hegemony” 
(65). The Resettlement Program can be positioned within the context 
of IWC: the lives of those living in these communities were presented 
as no longer sustainable in the context of an emerging and modernizing 
society, and generations of families were uprooted as their rural way of 
life was undermined or destroyed. This uprooting was exacerbated by 
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the closure of the fisheries and subsequent cod moratorium in 1992, 
which can be read through an anthropocentric position bolstered by 
IWC. Factors in the closure of the fisheries included government mis-
management of the fisheries and competition from large corporations 
to “develop ever more effective but capital-intensive ways to catch more 
fish, continuing to believe in the endless bounty of the sea even in the 
face of declining catches” (Wyile, Anne 36). These forms of environ-
mental governance seek to exploit natural resources for human need and 
economic gain. The resettlement and moratorium had, and continue to 
have, far-reaching social and economic reverberations for small-town 
fisheries and communities like the one depicted in Sweetland, uprooting 
generations of families whose identities were based upon a close connec-
tion to the sea, thereby emphasizing that these three modes of ecological 
being — mental, environmental, and social — operate in conjunction 
with one another.
These momentous changes in Newfoundland over the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century meant that “what it means to be a 
Newfoundlander” changed dramatically, and the loss of a particular way 
of life was tied to that change. In an article for The Globe and Mail on 
the changing face of Newfoundland and Labrador, Crummey stressed 
a sense of loss:
It’s a sad fact of life that the disappearance of these and other out-
port communities won’t alter much about the world at large. The 
GDP won’t change, the oil boom will carry on pumping money 
into provincial coffers, the northeast Avalon will continue to be 
swallowed by cookie-cutter suburbs. In almost every way we quan-
tify such things, their absence will make no difference. But the loss 
we’re facing is real, if subtler and harder to measure.
 It may be true that we won’t be poorer without them. But 
we will be, intangibly and inevitably, something less. (“What It 
Means”)
For Crummey, the loss of these communities because of the ongoing 
impact of the Resettlement Program is acute. In the context of IWC, 
this loss is not necessarily “quantifiable,” but it is nonetheless significant 
because it alters the sense of both identity and community in contem-
porary Newfoundland. The reconfiguration of a Newfoundland iden-
tity in the face of these contemporary crises is reflected in much of the 
literature emerging from the province. The diversity of subject matter 
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and style of these novels has incited Paul Chafe to assert that “to read 
any contemporary novel about Newfoundland is to become witness [to] 
and participant [in] . . . the active refashioning of what it means to be a 
Newfoundlander” (“If I Were”). The suggestion here is that the fiction 
being produced is contributing to shifting perceptions of what consti-
tutes a “Newfoundland identity” in the twenty-first century. Chafe 
differentiates between contemporary novels that frequently pay “more 
attention” to “characters and plot rather than place” and those that dem-
onstrate a more “one-sided relationship between person and place” (“If 
I Were”), thereby highlighting how authors vary in their approaches to 
and depictions of Newfoundland and Newfoundland identity. In many 
ways, Sweetland occupies a space between the two forms of novel identi-
fied by Chafe. It both explores and troubles the “one-sided relationship 
between person and place,” and it examines the changing form of sub-
jectivity in the context of contemporary Newfoundland. In doing so, the 
novel addresses the sense of loss but also offers the potential for recon-
figuration by demonstrating how, in the context of the Anthropocene, 
new models of relational ontologies can help to overcome this sense by 
denying oppositional thinking and decentring the sovereign position 
of the human.
Sweetland is divided into “The King’s Seat” and “The Keeper’s 
House,” which offer differing perspectives on selfhood and subjectivity 
in relation to place in the Anthropocene. Written in a realist style, the 
first half of the novel helps to establish that the identity of Moses is 
constructed in hierarchical relation to the island and its other inhabit-
ants through an anthropocentric sense of place. There is a strong focus 
on the quotidian lives of Moses and the islanders. The everyday life of 
Moses as he hunts rabbits, plants potatoes in his garden, and fishes helps 
to position the novel within the “stereotypical association of Atlantic-
Canadian literature with a kind of rock-bound, elemental, simplistic 
realism” (Wyile, “Surf ’s Up!” 9). This focus on his connection to the 
land, as Chafe describes it, is an attempt by Moses to establish him-
self as “an authentic and authorized occupant of Sweetland-the-island” 
(“Entitlement” 7). By working the land, Moses believes that he will gain 
a more justified relationship with it, assuming that “his labour garners 
him an authority over the place” (“Entitlement” 13). Consequently, his 
grafting in the first half of the novel is not only a realist literary tech-
nique of documenting the “everyday” but also an attempt to control the 
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land, to establish himself as superior to it, and consequently to construct 
a highly anthropocentric sense of place.
No distinct reasons are given for why Moses decides to stay on the 
island, but there are strong indications in Sweetland that he feels bound 
to the island that anchors his subjectivity. Following an angry exchange 
with Rita, also a long-standing inhabitant of the island, he contemplates 
why he is so determined to stay:
He could hardly admit to knowing why he felt a particular way 
about anything. The stronger the feeling, the less able he was to 
break it down into identifiable categories, into cause and effect. But 
he wasn’t accustomed to being called out for the lack and it served 
only to make him increasingly close-mouthed and obstinate. His 
conviction more firmly anchored as the holdouts dwindled, as if to 
offset the loss in numbers with a blind uncertainty.
 He found himself enjoying it almost, to be the one knot they 
couldn’t untangle. Holding on like grim death and halfways 
invigorated by the effort. Twisted, Ruthie used to say of him, and 
Sweetland couldn’t argue her assessment. Or change his way in the 
world. (49)
This passage gives an indication of the subjectivity of Moses. The 
aggressive language positions him as closed off, driven by obstinacy and 
sheer refusal to change his “way in the world.” It is a highly reaction-
ary position, and Moses distances himself from those around him by 
upholding his own perspective. Edward Relph considers that our sense 
of belonging to a specific place is gained from the meanings that we 
have attached to it, but these meanings are dependent on how “inside” 
or “outside” a place we are (49), thereby constructing a hierarchy of 
and exclusivity to places, disallowing those who do not have such fixed 
attachments to geographical places. Crummey draws attention to the 
fact that Moses is very much inside the island of Sweetland — through 
his eponymous connection to it and his feeling that he had “been meas-
ured and made to the island’s exact specifications” (280). This align-
ment between man and island and his refusal to “change his way in 
the world” indicate his unwillingness to change his sense of self and 
subjectivity in relation to the island. Emphasizing the realist style of the 
novel’s first half, the narrative impact of “cause and effect” means that 
the repercussions of this style are plentiful. Moses vehemently decides 
to remain on the island when the resettlement program is instigated, 
84 Scl/Élc
even though it will be implemented only if all the residents agree to it. 
The reimbursement offers inhabitants a minimum of $100,000 (10), 
and consequently Moses begins to receive death threats as he clearly 
isolates the other islanders by his obstinance. His decision to stay will 
also negatively affect his few remaining family members, his niece Clara 
and his great-nephew Jesse. It is hinted that Jesse is on the autism spec-
trum and that moving to St. John’s would give him access to a tailored 
school program and a more thorough doctor’s assessment (29). Moses 
thereby privileges himself over others on the island, setting himself up 
in opposition to them as he asserts his sovereign sense of self over the 
place that he inhabits.
Moses positions himself above both other inhabitants of the island 
and those who would be considered as typically outside this fixed and 
coherent sense of place — the Sri Lankan refugees whom he rescues 
with his boat in the opening scene of the novel. Although this scene 
does not offer us much insight into his subjectivity, Moses does char-
acterize the Sri Lankan refugees with a troubling racial generalization: 
“He looked Indian, Sweetland thought, or some variation of Indian, he 
never could tell that crowd one from the other” (4). This perspective 
situates the Sri Lankan refugees as racialized others and sets up a dual-
ism between them and Moses. He later recollects how he uncovered his 
sister’s adultery with the reverend when he visits the church where she 
is supposedly mourning the death of one of the refugees. Also, “He had 
no inkling how long he would drag those peculiar men in his wake. 
He almost resented having found them out there for a time, thinking 
he’d never have discovered the truth about Ruthie otherwise and would 
have been happier not knowing” (246). Not only does the phrasing 
“drag[ging]” the “peculiar men in his wake” have racist implications, 
but also Moses aligns his far more trivial discovery of his sister’s affair 
(and subsequently pushing her into another marriage) with the plight 
of the refugees left adrift in the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, by refusing 
to acknowledge their suffering, he places himself above the refugees in 
a highly anthropocentric hierarchy.
Gothic Interventions: Destabilizing the Sense of Place
The second half of the novel destabilizes the subjectivity of Moses and 
his sense of place. “The Keeper’s House” thus provides a stark contrast 
to the realist first half of Sweetland, in which there is a strong focus on 
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the quotidian and a plot structured on “cause and effect.” Indeed, his 
subjectivity in the first half, though constructed in relation to the island, 
remains highly internalized. Beginning after Moses fakes his own death 
in order to remain on the island alone, the novel takes an uneasy turn 
when gothic tropes begin to permeate it. Consequently, his subjectivity 
is slowly dismantled through these tropes of death, madness, ghosts, and 
dismembered animals, which serve continually to undermine conven-
tional constructions of the human subject as stable and bound to geo-
graphical place — capable of viewing the world outside from a fixed and 
static position. Moses is thus forced to question his identity and sanity 
as he is left alone on the island, and he begins to experience various 
spectral encounters. These moments are gothic because they represent 
the uncanny for Moses — a sudden transformation of the island that he 
knows so well into something unknown. Translating the word uncanny 
back into its original German of unheimlich or “unhomely” demon-
strates how something known and familiar to Moses, his sense of place, 
becomes unfamiliar and frightening. There are various instances of this 
throughout the second half of the novel. In one scene, Moses names the 
various points of Sweetland on a map — “dotting the shoreline with 
islands and communities and features that didn’t exist, naming them 
all after people he knew” (248). This pattern of naming echoes a similar 
move that he makes at night, naming the points on the map after the 
real geographical places, “being careful to include as much detail as 
possible” (239). Such naming becomes an act of trying to maintain the 
sense of place that Moses holds on to — as Neil Evernden points out, 
the “act of naming may itself be a part of the process of establishing 
a sense of place” (101). Moses uses the real geographical place names 
initially before describing them as people who lived on the island.
The moment of this naming is uncanny in the final and highly 
significant scene of Sweetland. Moses awakens after passing out after 
nearly drowning and goes to look at the map where he drew the names:
He had to work up the nerve to look closer, bringing the lamp down 
across the map for the light. Where he expected to see Sweetland 
there was nothing but blue water. And Little Sweetland beside it 
the same. The names he’d written across the islands were gone. He 
thought Keith might have erased them, but even the ink outlines 
the names had been printed over were missing from the map. As if 
he’d only imagined seeing them there. (316-17)
86 Scl/Élc
In this unnerving scene, the island that Moses thought he knew so 
well — had named every part of to establish his knowledge of and 
relationship with — disappears in a haunting moment of watery dissolu-
tion. Therefore, this naming, as a mode by which he tries to establish a 
stable sense of place and a subjectivity in relation to that place, becomes 
utterly dissolved, unfamiliar, and replaced by “blue water.” David Punter 
claims that the uncanny functions by this process, whereby “below, 
or athwart, the ‘grounding’ of our conceptions and self-conception — 
below, indeed, the ‘conception’ of the self — there is another force at 
work, which serves to undo, or to have already undone, the sureties by 
which we try to live” (“Uncanny” 132). The uncanny exists alongside a 
stable sense of self and reveals the inconsistencies of that self, undermin-
ing the foundations and grounding principles upon which we base this 
conception of self as stable, coherent, and whole.
By utilizing tenets of the gothic, Crummey captures the anxieties 
that Moses experiences when faced with this issue and the possibility 
of leaving the island that he knows so deeply. His stable sense of place 
is disrupted and undermined. The island of Sweetland represents an 
inward-looking site — self-contained and isolated, like the traditional 
castle of gothic novels, the island represents a space cut off from the rest 
of the world, mirroring the protagonist’s psyche as both Sweetlands are 
left alone and closed off. Laurie Brinklow emphasizes this, commenting 
that the island is a “compressed space” with a “real boundary that is the 
ocean” (133). The mental state of Moses is thus reflected in the island; 
he is left alone, isolated with no power, no running water, and no one 
else around but the strange spectral presences that he begins to see and 
feel. Yet in these moments when the island becomes uncanny to Moses 
there is, as Punter states, “another force at work” (“Uncanny” 132) — 
revealing something other on the island that imbues it with supernatural 
agents. In Sweetland, Moses begins to think that he is going insane, 
suspecting that he is “[l]osing his frigging mind” (231). A number of 
terrifying, uncanny moments occur. In one instance, Moses visits his 
friend Duke’s barber shop. During the first half of the novel, the two 
men play chess there, but in the second half Moses notices that the chess 
pieces on the board have moved, with the “black king in check” (222). 
In another example, Moses is adrift at sea, and haunting music guides 
him back to shore, but when he reaches the coast he no longer hears the 
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music (220). All of these moments suggest an alternative, supernatural 
agency on the island.
Moses frequently passes off moments of supernatural occurrences 
as dreams or figments of his imagination. He imagines telling Duke 
about some of the events before realizing that his response would be 
skeptical: “You’re dreaming, he’d have said. You been drinking bad 
brew. You needs to give your head a goddam good shake” (222). Denials 
of these moments of the supernatural and attempts to rationalize them 
— through either being insane or dreaming — mean that Sweetland 
inhabits a place where the boundaries between a known, familiar reality 
and the unknown supernatural are blurred. As Kelly Hurley observes, 
the “unnerving possibility of one’s own madness is preferable to the still 
more unnerving one of supernatural agency disrupting known, familiar 
realities” (15). By believing in one’s madness, one asserts some agency 
over uncanny events. It is an attempt to provide a reason for them since 
the alternative would be something frightening. For Moses, the “known, 
familiar realities” are the island that he thinks he knows so deeply and 
the sense of place that accompanies it. Confronted with hauntings and 
ghostly presences, it is preferable, at least initially, for Moses to attribute 
them to madness or “bad brew” rather than to otherworldly phenomena.
The madness of Moses extends outward, infecting the reader and 
disrupting any “known, familiar realities.” The first half of Sweetland 
lures the reader into a false sense of security through the realist style. In 
this half, any incursion of the supernatural is thoroughly dismissed. One 
such moment is when Jesse sees Hollis, the dead brother of Moses, who 
discusses these sightings and interactions with his niece, Jesse’s mother, 
asking her “Have they got a name for it yet? . . . Whatever is wrong 
with the youngster” (29). Moses claims Jesse’s sightings as symptomatic 
of something abnormal, and his mother confirms that Jesse has been 
diagnosed with a form of autism (30). The apparition of Hollis is thus 
reasoned away with a medical diagnosis. Moreover, any other “occur-
rences,” such as the dismemberment of rabbits in the snares that Moses 
sets, are attributed to one of the other islanders. Such security is not 
afforded in the second half of the novel: with everyone gone, there is no 
one to provide reason besides Moses himself — for both himself and 
the reader. So, when ghosts and hauntings fissure the second half, the 
reader is intensely connected with Moses. In short, the reader must ask 
whether the realism of the first half is being punctured by supernatural 
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events or whether Moses is descending into madness. The reader thus 
becomes ungrounded.
By throwing the reader from the rational reason and familiar realism 
of the first half into the more uncertain and supernatural second half, 
Sweetland challenges the relationship among madness, the reader, and 
Moses. Scott Brewster considers the relationship among these elements 
— madness, the reader, and the narrator or protagonist) — in gothic 
fiction. Drawing on Fred Botting (Gothic; Limits) and David Punter 
(“Narrative”), who argue that the gothic generates multiple readings 
eliciting a form of madness in the reader,5 Brewster argues that this 
madness is further complicated by the psychoanalytical framework that 
the gothic simultaneously invokes and undermines. He asserts that the 
“[g]othic at once objectifies and lives out the madness it encounters, 
striving for a metalanguage to categorise or explain insanity at the same 
time as it performs, even participates in, that very irrationality” (483). 
The gothic seeks to rationalize itself while undermining that rational-
ity — a means to explain the very irrational encounters that it seeks. 
Brewster insists that readers must be involved in this process, stating 
that they must participate in uncovering, categorizing, or explaining 
the insanity that they encounter alongside the narrator or protagon-
ist. They too become subject to the madness invoked in the novel, for 
through the analytical process “to ‘see’ delusion or mental aberration is 
to mimic or reproduce it, to occupy its place” (485). In Sweetland, there 
is a continual search for explanations, raising questions about whether 
the ghostly encounters are the results of Moses having passed out drunk, 
high, or from sheer exposure to the elements. Thus, the reader is imbri-
cated through the novel’s structure: the halves move the reader through 
a familiar reality, a firm sense of place, and a certainty of the subjectiv-
ity of Moses to a reality in which they similarly experience moments of 
disorientation, uncertainty, and dissolution of reason.
One instance is the ghostly appearance of Hollis. His previous 
appearances to Jesse were explained away by reference to the child’s 
autism, but in the second half of Sweetland the ghost appears to Moses 
after he has nearly drowned at sea and returns home. He is injured and 
likely suffering from exposure after walking home. Moses drifts through 
what could be sleep and a dream and has a possible hallucination of the 
government officers. He awakes, and the world is “askew” (307) before 
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he realizes that someone is sitting beside the window, and he recognizes 
the ghost of his brother:
Sweetland closed his eyes again. “Is Jesse with you?” he said and 
he waited a long time for a reply before he glanced around again. 
Still just one pair of boots under the table. He felt too vulnerable 
suddenly to stay where he was and he forced himself to his knees, 
hefted his fractured weight into the chair he’d been sitting in before 
he passed out. Looked across at his brother in the chair opposite. 
The young face so pale it glowed like the underside of sea ice. The 
kelpy hair streaming, his dead eyes glassy and expressionless. (308)
Perhaps this appearance of Hollis is the result of injuries that cause 
Moses to hallucinate. This position is countered by his engagement 
with the ghost — Moses asks if Jesse is “with” his brother — and the 
fact that the monstrous reconfiguration of his brother — soaking wet, 
pale as ice, and covered in seaweed — sits before him. This indicates 
that all along Hollis might have existed as a ghost, thereby refuting the 
initial, reasoned, and rational explanations of the first half of the book.
The trustworthiness of Moses, and of the novel itself, is called into 
question as the previously firm boundaries that separate the realism 
of the first half of the novel from the second half become even more 
blurred. This is another impact of Sweetland ’s gothic imperative — 
continually raising more questions than it answers. The gothic text 
thereby acts reflexively, prompting the reader to search for answers in 
the text but offering none, leaving the reader hesitating between the 
known and the unknown and forced to “compulsively interpret random 
signs, haunted by the possibility that we may be deluded” (Brewster 
493). Through the continuing process of interpretation, the reader is 
consequently never allowed any full sense of closure in Sweetland, in 
which no reason or rational explanation fully triumphs, and is left with 
only more questions and the possibility of one’s own delusion. This 
denial of closure has resonances with what Hurley sees as the fantas-
tic text’s capability to “disrupt conventional meaning systems” and to 
make “room for new ones to emerge” (7). The realism of the first half, 
while appearing closed and unified, is disrupted as the second half sees 
the non-human and supernatural emerge, creating new possibilities 
for understanding our relationship to place. It is only when Moses is 
left alone on the island, removed from the anthropocentric reason that 
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governs the first half, that the island begins to display agentic capacities 
of its own.
Posthuman Gothic Reconfigurations
Although the gothic elements of Sweetland dismantle the subjectivity 
of Moses and his sense of place, they also reconfigure them, providing 
for him a new mode of posthuman ontology much more interconnected 
with the island and its non-human agency. As Moses remains on the 
island, his own anthropocentric and agentic capacities are no longer the 
driving force that ensures his survival but often the results of unknown 
agencies on the island itself. He gradually comes to this realization as 
he experiences more hauntings. Disembodied music guides Moses back 
to shore when he is adrift at sea (219). Similarly, at another point, on 
uncovering dead gulls washed up on shore, he recognizes that
There was a new world being built around him. Sweetland had 
heard them talking about it for years on the Fisheries Broadcast — 
apocalyptic weather, rising sea levels, alterations in the seasons, in 
ocean temperatures. Fish migrating north in search of colder water 
and the dovekies lost in the landscape they were made for. The 
generations of instinct they’d relied on to survive here suddenly 
useless. The birds and their habits were being rendered obsolete, 
Sweetland thought, like the VHS machines and analog televisions 
dumped on the slopes beyond the incinerator. Relics of another 
time and on their way out. (277)
When he sees the dead birds, for the first time in the novel Moses begins 
to extend his view of the island beyond simply his own bound and closed 
sense of place, understanding the impact of actions on the environment. 
The place that he supposedly knew so deeply is being infiltrated by 
those whom he simply heard about on the radio, removed from a real-
ity that he considered unchanging and unaffected. Sweetland no longer 
represents a “compressed space” bound by the ocean (Brinklow 133). 
Like the birds that he sees before him, Moses appreciates that, to carry 
on with this relationship to place, he risks being “rendered obsolete” 
and must develop a new understanding of the island if he is to survive.
One way in which this new understanding is developed is through 
a reconfiguration of the human subject via a recognition of its watered 
embodiment. Posthuman feminist phenomenologist Astrida Neimanis 
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dismantles the human subject as a coherent, impermeable subject 
through f luidity and therefore posits new understandings of human 
and non-human subjectivity and embodiment. She argues that embodi-
ment is dependent on our watery composition, and this f low of water 
that comprises us connects us to other humans. She asserts that “Our 
watery relations within (or more accurately: as) a more-than-human 
hydrocommons thus present a challenge to anthropocentrism, and the 
privileging of the human as the sole or primary site of embodiment” 
(2). Because we have a “hybrid assemblage of matters” that makes up 
our embodiment, we cannot be considered as simply human — we are 
continually comprised of an ever-changing matter — yet “This is not 
to forsake our inescapable humanness, but to suggest that the human is 
always more-than-human. Our wateriness verifies this, both materially 
and conceptually” (2). Neimanis asserts that through a complex watery 
embodiment, humans continually experience processes of flowing and 
connecting with other bodies — both human and non-human — and 
as such humans are never completely just human: whole, discrete, and 
impermeable. This scene with the dead birds suggests how the mutual 
interaction of a shared hydrocommons has far-reaching political impli-
cations environmentally, socially, and economically that dismantle the 
fixed and established sense of place. Human interconnectivity through 
water expands on a global scale and takes into account every other liv-
ing being on the planet. Intrarelations with water are thus also deeply 
imbricated within power relations: ocean acidification and pollution, 
rising sea levels, and disappearing rivers operate alongside attempts to 
commodify and control water supplies amid their increasingly alarming 
scarcity with real consequences for the planet. Neimanis insists that in 
the Anthropocene humans must be conscious of this and careful not to 
remove or distance themselves from their watery origins (21). Therefore, 
as Moses looks out over the ocean at the dead birds, he gains a sense 
of interconnectivity and relationality through the ocean, envisioning 
himself within that framework and recognizing that this is part of the 
“new world being built around him.”
The ghostly apparition of Hollis in Sweetland proffers not only goth-
ic resonances of madness and the breakdown of the human subject but 
also a moment of reconstructing that subject — a moment of under-
standing and a re-evaluation by Moses for both his relationship with 
his brother and his sense of place. The return of Hollis is an uncanny 
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experience of the repressed, familiar other as exemplified in the sense of 
guilt that Moses feels about his brother’s death. Moses lies to his mother 
about his brother’s suicide, claiming instead that Hollis fell off the boat 
during a fishing trip, that his clothes got caught in the line, and that 
Moses cut the line to relieve the weight, but inevitably Hollis drowned. 
Moses retells this story to Jesse, continuing the lie, and says that the 
decision to cut the line was the “Worst thing I could’ve done” (134). 
However, this recognition might also refer to his shame about lying to 
his mother. The ghost of Hollis is a watery figure whose embodiment 
— “kelpy hair” and “young face” like “sea ice” — mirrors the sea (309). 
His ghost not only points to his death by drowning but is a metaphor 
for the relationship to the sea and an eerie premonition of the eventual 
watery engulfment of Sweetland, both man and island.
Hollis represents a moment of abhuman gothic possibility for Moses, 
displaying what Hurley would qualify as “the spectacle of a body meta-
morphic and undifferentiated; in place of the possibility of human 
transcendence, the prospect of an existence circumscribed within the 
realities of gross corporeality” (Hurley 3). Hollis offers an alternative 
in Sweetland to the existence of Moses on the island, the possibility of 
becoming something other and re-engaging with the island in a more 
fluid and open way. The appearance of Hollis occurs shortly after Moses 
has a near-death experience — a moment when he realizes that “There 
was the sway of things. . . . There was fighting the sway of things 
or improvising some fashion of riding it out. And then there was the 
sway of things beyond fighting and improvisation” (300). Moses con-
sequently accepts that the means by which he adapted his sense of place 
to the island must shift: not to fight against the currents and the island’s 
uncanny agents or improvise some means to “muddle through” and sur-
vive but to find some intermediate position between the two to negotiate 
and participate in the ebb and flow of the island itself. He realizes that 
he must not view himself as outside the “sway” of it.
The ghost of Hollis presents that possibility; severely injured and 
drifting through consciousness on the brink of death, Moses has a one-
way interaction with the ghost in a moment of acceptance and under-
standing. Moses nonetheless pursues a form of engagement:
[H]e thought he might offer some sort of apology then, but even 
in his addled state he could tell they were beyond apologies. He 
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clenched his teeth against the chattering. “It’s good to see you,” 
he said.
 And the figure nodded again in the same distracted fashion.
 “Say me to Jesse if you sees him,” Sweetland said. “And Ruthie.” 
(309)
Instead of being terrified by the ghost — deeming himself mad — 
Moses considers apologizing to it. The acceptance and closure that he 
gains from interaction with his brother’s ghost suggest how new models 
of subjectivity and embodiment can emerge within a gothic framework 
and be understood and embraced. In this instance, Moses acknowledges 
that this “being” represents a new way of viewing his existence in rela-
tion to the island. For Moses, this is finally achieved by Sweetland 
the island’s watery disappearance and Sweetland the man’s subsequent 
ghostly transformation.
In the final scene, this ghostly transformation is not perceived as 
death and imbued with mourning or grief. Instead, it is an affirma-
tive process that emphasizes vitalism and the joyful transformation of 
becoming. Braidotti has discussed in depth the potential of an affirma-
tive ethics,6 arguing that an ethics of affirmation turns negative affect 
into positive activity (“Affirmation” 244). Braidotti contrasts negative 
affect, a sense of being static and bound, with a more positive process 
of becoming. Negative affect is “not a value judgement . . . but rather 
the effect of arrest, blockage, and rigidification that comes as a result 
of an act of violence, betrayal, a trauma — or which can be self-per-
petuated through practices that our culture simultaneously chastises as 
self-destructive and cultivates as a mode of discipline and punishment” 
(“Affirmation” 247). In this sense, when negative affect occurs follow-
ing a traumatic event or self-inflicted behaviour, its stupefying nature 
prevents the subject from interrelating and connecting with other bodies 
— both human and non-human. To apply this to Moses, his sovereign 
sense of subjectivity, which connects him to the island, is traumatically 
disrupted. His rigid refusal to leave the island results in his great-nephew 
Jesse’s death at the end of the novel’s first half — a situation that leads 
Moses to fake his own death in order to remain there. This physical 
inertia to leave the island and let go of his sovereign sense of self can be 
correlated with Braidotti’s definition of negative affect. However, after 
his encounters with the spectral others of the island, his subjectivity 
begins to change, culminating in his own final ghostly transformation.
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Braidotti highlights an ethics of affirmation as the “transformative 
process of achieving freedom of understanding through the awareness 
of our limits, of our bondage. This results in the freedom to affirm one’s 
essence as joy, through encounters and minglings with other bodies, enti-
ties, beings, and forces. Ethics means faithfulness to this potentia [sic], 
or the desire to become” (“Affirmation” 245). Consequently, one turns 
negative affect into positive activity through the ability to recognize one’s 
own limitations, and that brings both freedom and capacity to connect 
better and relate to human and non-human others. As opposed to “fight-
ing against the sway of things,” of looking inward, Moses walks out into 
the night in the final scene of Sweetland, “along the back of his property 
and up beyond the new cemetery, away from all he’d ever known or 
wanted or wished for. At the King’s Seat he turned to look down on the 
water and there was nothing but a featureless black, as if the ocean was 
rising behind him and had already swallowed the cove and everything 
in it” (317). Moses turns away from all that has held him to a fixed and 
defined sense of place — the things that he has wanted from Sweetland 
the island. Instead, he looks out at the ocean as it seems to engulf him in 
a cathartic moment of watery dissolution. There is no real sense of loss or 
negative affect in this scene but awareness and understanding. He then 
joins the other spectral figures and walks toward the cliffs, becoming one 
of them standing and looking out over the ocean. He feels “anonymous” 
(318) among them, yet there is no negativity. The final line — “He felt all 
of a sudden like singing” (318) — suggests the joyful transformation that 
Braidotti defines as crucial to this ethics of affirmation. Moses embraces 
the anonymity and ghostly transformation. As one form of association 
to place is dismantled through his ghostly transformation, another is 
constructed — one more willing to accept the supernatural occurrences 
prompted by the island’s own agentic capacities, forces, and non-human 
beings. This new association denies the bound and closed subjectivity of 
the former sense of place that prevented this realization and awareness. 
Brinklow notes that, “Instead of dying alone on the island, Sweetland 
becomes part of the weave of life and death. . . . Moses is absorbed into 
the mirror that is the island” (142). By mingling with the other ghostly 
figures and achieving a ghostly transformation himself, Moses obtains a 
new form of subjectivity interrelated with human and non-human others, 
and he becomes part of the island itself. It is a subjectivity characterized 
by joy, freedom, and interconnectivity.
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Conclusion: Posthuman Becomings
In Sweetland, forms of subjectivity in relation to place and the sense of 
place are changed and reformed. By breaking down boundaries through 
the gothic tropes in the novel and destabilizing the perceptions of inside 
and outside as a coherent sense of self in relation to geographical place, 
the novel highlights the limiting and problematic factors that such a 
bound and fixed relationship to place can hold. Emerging at a time of 
geopolitical anxiety, the novel shows how new identities and links can 
be forged in the face of such anxieties. As such, the gothic mode of the 
novel becomes productive rather than merely “symptomatic” (Hurley 
6). The loss of Sweetland, both the man and the island, through the 
metaphorical engulfment by the ocean signals not a moment of loss or 
negative affect but a keen awareness of how overcoming such fixed sub-
jectivities — primarily in relation to place — is necessary in the face of 
these social, ecological, and cultural issues. Through the materializing 
of both man and island into the ocean, new material formations are 
constructed. This is a liberating experience that can help us to repos-
ition ourselves in relationship to the environment and the non-human. 
By letting go of the anthropocentric privilege that binds us to place, we 
can instead become with it, become entangled with it and appreciate 
our bodies’ morphic capabilities and our more-than-human capacity 
for change.
The final transformation of Moses rejects the anthropocentric per-
spective that he adopts in the first half of the novel as the boundaries 
that hold him connected to a fixed and coherent subjectivity disappear 
through this process of positive affirmation. Braidotti argues that the 
“practice of defamiliarization is a key methodological tool to support 
the postanthropocentric turn. That is a sobering process of disidenti-
fication from anthropocentric values, to evolve toward a new frame of 
reference, which in this case entails becoming relational in a complex 
and multi-directional manner” (“Four Theses” 30). In this sense, Moses 
also undergoes a process of becoming: the anthropocentric privilege 
that he previously occupied disappears. This in turn enables a stronger 
posthuman reconnection to and interaction with the island, in a way 
that reimagines his relationship with place extending across time, space, 
and species. The subjectivity that he gains is necessarily posthuman, 
according to Braidotti, since it typifies the idea of “an expanded rela-
tional vision of the self, as a nomadic transversal assemblage engendered 
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by the cumulative effect of multiple relational bonds” (“Four Theses” 
33). In other words, the transformation of Moses is enabled through his 
connection to the non-human forces of the island. He no longer adheres 
to a fixed and established sense of place and replaces it with one that 
repositions the subject as a complex, collective assemblage — interwoven 
with the other forces and non-human beings on the island. The moment 
when he turns his back on all that he has wished for and wanted of the 
island further solidifies this, showing how there is a stronger fluidity in 
this new subjectivity — Moses has decided to “change his way in the 
world” (49).
Notes
1 This is based upon the Household Resettlement Program, which began in 1954 in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Under the government of Joseph Smallwood, resettlement 
began with centralization in 1954 when those who volunteered to resettle in larger cities 
and towns were offered small sums of money as an incentive (Martin). A decade later 
the Fisheries Resettlement Program was introduced, and residents were moved to desig-
nated “growth centres” where “industries would be established, services centralized, and 
people regulated” (Kelly 22). These programs had, and continue to have, lasting impacts 
on Newfoundland and Labrador since they frequently divided communities and families. 
The Household Resettlement Program was renewed in 1970 under the Federal-Provincial 
Partnership, and though it remained in place officially only until 1977 many small com-
munities have sought government assistance to relocate in the twenty-first century.
2 The term “Anthropocene” was coined by ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer in the 
1980s but was later made popular by Paul J. Crutzen, primarily through the article “The 
Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?” (see Crutzen 
et al.).
3 There are numerous detailed studies of the socio-economic impact of the Household 
Resettlement Program. Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews offer case studies of com-
munities affected by the program. Miriam Wright focuses on the decline of the fisheries 
and the Fisheries Resettlement Program, providing a historical account of Smallwood’s 
attempts to transform the fisheries.
4 Resettlement remains a fraught and contentious issue in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Although relocation peaked during the mid-late twentieth century, many rural areas have 
recently taken relocation packages. The inhabitants of Great Harbour Deep voted to 
relocate in 2002, Petites was “abandoned in 2003,” and Grand Buit was deserted in 2010 
(Crummey, “What It Means”). Furthermore, the government increased the settlement offer 
from $100,000 to $270,000. Little Bay Islands is currently in the midst of debate on pos-
sible resettlement. In 2015, 89.47% voted to leave, falling just short of the required 90% 
(Cook). A new vote in March 2018 put the numbers at eighty-five to leave versus ten to 
stay (Bailey). For many, the decision to leave is driven by the need to access vital public 
services (O’Neill-Yates), but this need does not detract from the difficulty of leaving their 
homes and lives behind.
5 Punter claims that the gothic can incite a form of paranoia (Literature 183) and a kind 
Michael Crummey 97
of delirium — a “dreadful pleasure” (7) — that threatens the reader with the potential for 
the madness to spill out of the text. Botting similarly states that the gothic is a “writing of 
excess” (Gothic 1), which can also produce a “limit and challenge to the sway of reason” 
(Limits 116). Brewster draws on these points, claiming that the madness must exist both 
outside and inside the text, and traces how the very act of reading gothic texts can cause 
a kind of madness.
6 See also Braidotti, Nomadic Theory.
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